SUMMARY
A central question in causal inference with observational studies is the sensitivity of conclusions to unmeasured confounding. The classical Cornfield condition allows us to assess whether an unmeasured binary confounder can explain away the observed relative risk of the exposure on the outcome. It states that for an unmeasured confounder to explain away an observed relative risk, the association between the unmeasured confounder and the exposure, and also that 15 between the unmeasured confounder and the outcome, must both be larger than the observed relative risk. In this paper, we extend the classical Cornfield condition in three directions. First, we consider analogous conditions for the risk difference, and allow for a categorical, not just a binary, unmeasured confounder. Second, we provide more stringent thresholds which the maximum of the above-mentioned associations must satisfy, rather than simply weaker conditions 20 that both must satisfy. Third, we show that all previous results on Cornfield conditions hold under weaker assumptions than previously used. We illustrate their potential applications by real examples, where our new conditions give more information than the classical ones.
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Causal inference in observational studies is often jeopardized by unmeasured confounding. For example, it can be the case that the crude association between the exposure and the outcome is positive, but their association is negative within each stratum of a confounder. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the Yule-Simpson paradox, and within the context of causal inference is referred to as confounding. For instance, the association between cigarette smoking and lung 30 cancer was historically accounted for by two competing theories: cigarette smoking has a causal effect on lung cancer; or cigarette smoking is not causative for lung cancer, and their crude association is purely due to a common genetic cause that influences both of them. R. A. Fisher was a major proponent of the second theory, viewing the Yule-Simpson paradox as an Achilles' heel of causal inference in observational studies (Fisher, 1957) . Instead of taking a completely 35 dismissive view on observational studies, Cornfield et al. (1959) asked the following question regarding the common cause theory: How strong should the unmeasured confounder be, in order to explain away the association between the exposure and outcome?
The previous literature on Cornfield conditions are derived under the conditional independence of the exposure E and the outcome D given the confounder U , i.e., E D | U . The ignorability assumption involving potential outcomes guarantees the causal interpretation of Assumptions 2 and 3. Analogous assumptions can also be made using the causal diagram framework (Pearl, 1995) . Without a formal causal framework, the Cornfield conditions under E D | U are the 70 empirical conditions to explain away the crude exposure-outcome association by the association between E and U and that between U and D. Cornfield et al. (1959) derived their original conditions considering a binary confounder U . Let
CORNFIELD CONDITIONS FOR THE RELATIVE RISK WITH A BINARY CONFOUNDER
RD ED = pr(D = 1 | E = 1) − pr(D = 1 | E = 0) and RR ED = pr(D = 1 | E = 1)/pr(D =
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1 | E = 0) denote the risk difference and the relative risk of the exposure E on the outcome D. The risk difference and relative risk for other variables can be defined analogously. Without essential loss of generality, we assume RR ED ≥ 1 and RR EU ≥ 1. The conditions for preventive exposures are analogous. Cornfield et al. (1959) showed that when the confounder U is binary and Assumption 2 holds, it must be true that
which means that the relative risk of E on U is greater than or equal to the relative risk of E on D; and also (cf. Schlesselman, 1978 )
i.e., the relative risk of U on D is greater than or equal to the relative risk of E on D. Thus, for a binary unmeasured confounder to explain away an observed relative risk, the relative risk between the exposure and the unmeasured confounder and between the unmeasured confounder 85 and the outcome must both be greater than the observed exposure-outcome relative risk. These necessary conditions under Assumption 2 are often now referred to as the classical Cornfield conditions. Cornfield et al. (1959) obtained their results for a binary confounder U under Assumption 2. 90 We show in the Supplementary Material that under the weaker Assumption 1 condition (1) still holds, and condition (2) can be replaced by
GENERALIZED CORNFIELD CONDITIONS FOR THE RELATIVE RISK
where RR U D|E=1 and RR U D|E=0 are the relative risk of U on D with and without exposure, respectively. Lee (2011) discussed the case when U is categorical with levels 0, 1, . . . , K − 1. Define 95 p k = pr(E = 1 | U = k) as the probability of the exposure within U = k, q k = p k /(1 − p k ) as the odds of the exposure within U = k, and U E = max k q k / min k q k as the ratio of the maximum and the minimum of these odds. Define r k = pr(D = 1 | E = 0, U = k) as the probability of the outcome without exposure and with U = k, and U D = max k r k / min k r k as the ratio of the maximum and the minimum of these probabilities. Similarly, define r * k = pr(D = 1 | E = 1, U = k) 100 as the probability of the outcome with exposure and U = k, and U * D = max k r * k / min k r * k . When U is binary, U E reduces to the odds ratio between E and U , U D reduces to RR U D|E=0 , and U * D reduces to RR U D|E=1 .
Under Assumption 2, r k = r * k , and so U D = U * D . Consequently, Lee (2011) showed that the Cornfield condition
holds for categorical U . He also derived a generalized Cornfield condition for the maximum of U E and U D : (3) and (4).
5. GENERALIZED CORNFIELD CONDITIONS FOR THE RISK DIFFERENCE Because of Cornfield et al. (1959) 's influential work, sensitivity analysis based on ratio measures has long been predominant in epidemiology. However, sometimes the risk difference is of 120 interest and sensitivity analysis can likewise be conducted using the risk difference. Poole (2010) moreover showed, via a real example, that dismissal of the risk difference in sensitivity analysis will sometimes restrict evidence for important scientific findings, a point that we will discuss later.
For the risk difference, we define
The parameter α k measures the difference in the probability that U takes a particular value k comparing exposed and unexposed, and A is the maximum of these absolute differences. Define
The parameters β 1k and β 0k measure the difference in the probability of the outcome comparing 130 category of U = k to U = 0 in the exposed and unexposed groups, respectively; and B is the maximum of these absolute differences. When Assumption 2 holds,
For a binary confounder U with categories 0 and 1, A = RD EU is the risk difference of E on U , and B = max(|RD U D|E=1 |, |RD U D|E=0 |) is the maximum of the absolute values of the 135 risk differences of U on D with and without exposure. Under Assumption 2, since RD U D|E=1 = RD U D|E=0 , B = RD U D is the risk difference of U on D. The generalized Cornfield conditions for the risk difference with a binary confounder are shown below.
THEOREM 1. If the confounder U is binary with K = 2 and Assumption 1 holds, then
Under Assumption 2, conditions (5) and (6) can be further simplified to
The Cornfield conditions for the risk difference for a binary confounder thus show that for an unmeasured confounder to explain away an observed risk difference for E on D, the risk difference for E on U and also that for U on D must both be larger than the observed risk difference for E on D. Moreover, the maximum of these two risk differences for the unmeasured confounder must be greater than the square root of the observed risk difference for E on D. Cornfield et al. (1959) obtained, but did not appreciate the significance of equation RD ED = RD EU RD U D , which leads to conditions (7) and (8). Gastwirth et al. (1998) and Poole (2010) discussed the first Cornfield condition (7) for the risk difference in the presence of a binary confounder, and the second one (8) is new to the best of our knowledge. Although quite simple, the new square root bounds (6) and (8) can be substantial improvements over (5) and (7), since 150 RD ED is very small in many applications.
We can further extend these Cornfield conditions for the risk difference to allow for a categorical, rather than binary, confounder U with an arbitrary number of categories. However, the generalized Cornfield conditions for the risk difference then depend on the number of categories of the confounder U . With more than two categories, we have the following conditions.
Theorem 2 does not rely on the choice of the reference level of U , so continues to hold if we arbitrarily relabel some other level to be U = 0. Inequalities (9) to (11) show that the conditions for A and B become weaker with a larger value of K. For example, if U has three categories with K = 3, as would often be the case with a genetic confounder, the generalized Cornfield 160 conditions above can be simplified as
Although the conditions above are weaker when U has three categories, the lower bound of the maximum of A and B, (RD ED /2) 1/2 , can still be very informative even if RD ED is small. In many practical problems, the following monotonicity assumption is plausible.
Assumption 4 requires that each non-zero category of U is more prevalent under exposure than without the exposure. If only one category of U is less prevalent under exposure, Assumption 4 holds if we choose this category to be the reference level U = 0. For example, Assumption 4 holds for a binary confounder U without imposing any restrictions.
THEOREM 3. With a categorical confounder U (K ≥ 2), under Assumptions 1 and 4,
For example, the conditions in (12) with a three category confounder can be improved to
We call (5) to (16) the generalized Cornfield conditions for the risk difference. The bounds from (5) to (16) are sharp, in the sense that they cannot be improved without additional assumptions. The bounds given above for Assumption 2 are all also sharp under Assumption 3. The proofs for attaining the bounds are all given in the Supplementary Material.
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PENG DING AND TYLER J. VANDERWEELE 6. ILLUSTRATIONS Example 1. Poole (2010) discussed an example concerning insights from the Confield conditions for the risk difference, which were overlooked by Cornfield et al. (1959) . Hammond and Horn (1958) 's study of smoking and death from coronary artery disease found that RR ED = 1.7 and RD ED = 0.013%. Based on the relative risks, there is limited evidence for a true causal 180 of smoking on death, since the crude relative risk of smoking on death RR ED = 1.7 is smaller than the relative risk of bad temper in smokers and nonsmokers RR EU = 2.6 found in Lilienfeld (1959)'s study. However, the risk difference of the exposure on bad temper is smaller than the observed risk difference of the exposure on the outcome, since RD EU = 0.012% < RD ED . Poole (2010) noted that if we assume U = bad temper, then the common cause U could not explain 185 away the risk difference of smoking on death from coronary artery diseases.
Poole's observation was very insightful. Unfortunately, however, the difference between the exposure-confounder association RD EU = 0.012% and the actual observed exposure-outcome association RD ED = 0.013% is very small and likely within sampling variabilities of these studies. In fact, Poole (2010) noted that RD ED = 0.012% in Doll and Hill (1964)'s study, 190 and then the basic Cornfield condition RD EU ≥ RD ED would not be sufficient to reject the common cause theory. However, if we were willing to assume that the risk difference between smoking and bad temper is stronger than the risk difference between bad temper and death, i.e., RD EU > RD U D|E=1 and RD EU > RD U D|E=0 , then by the generalized Cornfield conditions for the measures of RD EU and max(RD U D|E=1 , RD U D|E=0 ) given in (6), for the 195 unmeasured common cause bad temper to explain away the effect, we would require that RD EU = max(RD EU , RD U D|E=1 , RD U D|E=0 ) ≥ RD 1/2 ED = (0.012%) 1/2 = 1.095%, which is more than 84 times larger than the observed RD EU . The confounder bad temper could then not explain away the association, and the evidence for causation would be very strong.
Example 2. R. A. Fisher conjectured that "cigarette-smoking and lung cancer, though 200 not mutually causative, are both influenced by a common cause, in this case the individual genotype" (Fisher, 1957) . Consider the case that the genotype has three categories (AA, Aa, aa), where the Cornfield condition with a binary confounder does not apply. From Hammond and Horn (1958) 's study, the relative risk and the risk difference of smoking on lung cancer are RR ED = 10.7 and RD ED = 0.094%. If we want to as-205 sume no average causal effect of smoking on lung cancer, the generalized Cornfield conditions for the risk ratio require that min(U E , U ′ D ) ≥ RR ED = 10.7, and max(U E , U ′ D ) ≥ {RR 1/2 ED + (RR ED − 1) 1/2 } 2 = (10.7 1/2 + 9.7 1/2 ) 2 = 40.77. Without Assumption 4, our conditions for the risk difference require A ≥ RD ED /2 = 0.047%, B ≥ RD ED /2 = 0.047%, and max(A, B) ≥ (RD ED /2) 1/2 = 2.168%, and with Assumption 4, the condition for B can be fur-210 ther improved to B ≥ RD ED = 0.094%. These bounds are all useful for determining whether a certain genotype can explain away the association between smoking and lung cancer.
DISCUSSION
The risk difference scale can sometimes be used in sensitivity analysis. More specifically, as pointed out by Poole (2010) , the Cornfield conditions for the risk difference can be useful for 215 discovering causal effects in observational studies. Our new lower bound of the maximum of RD EU and max(RD U D|E=1 , RD U D|E=0 ) is a significant improvement of the basic Cornfield condition for the risk difference with a binary confounder, when the risk difference of the exposure on the outcome is small. We also illustrate its usefulness in Example 1, where the lower bound may provide a sharper conclusion.
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The results in our paper are also interesting from a theoretical perspective in two further respects. First, it has been argued that causal conclusions are most sensitive to an unobserved confounder that is binary rather than categorical or continuous, at least when using matched pairs analysis. It has been suggested that it thus suffices to perform sensitivity analysis with a binary confounder (Wang and Krieger, 2006) . However, these results on the conservative nature of a 225 binary confounder were derived with sensitivity analysis parameters expressed on a ratio scale. In this paper, we have likewise seen that using a ratio scale the Cornfield conditions for a categorical unmeasured confounder in (3) are essentially identical to those with a binary unmeasured confounder in (1) and (2). For relative risks, a binary unmeasured confounder seems to once again suffice. However, our results here for the risk difference demonstrate that the generalized 230 Cornfield conditions for the risk difference do depend on the number of categories of the unmeasured confounder U . The requirements on the unmeasured confounder weaken as the number of categories of U increases. Thus the sensitivity of the causal conclusions when the unmeasured confounder is binary is not the most conservative case if the sensitivity analysis parameters are expressed on the risk difference scale.
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Second, since Cornfield et al. (1959) 's seminal work, the relative risk measure has often been claimed to be better suited for assessing causality. Poole (2010) recently summarized the historical reasons for this and also criticized this notion. Our results demonstrate that the generalized Cornfield conditions for the risk difference do depend on the number of categories of U , while those for the relative risk do not. The Cornfield conditions for the risk difference become less 240 informative as the number of categories increases. The Cornfield conditions for the relative risk do not suffer from this problem. Therefore, using the relative risk for assessing causality may in fact have some basis, because the generalized Cornfield conditions for the relative risk do not depend on the number of categories of U . Proof. Define f = pr(U = 1), p e = pr(E = 1), f 1 = pr(U = 1 | E = 1), and f 0 = pr(U = 1 | E = 0). We have f = p e f 1 + (1 − p e )f 0 , and we assume
For simplicity in the proof, we use RR 1 = RR U D|E=1 = r * 1 /r * 0 and RR 0 = RR U D|E=0 = 275 r 1 /r 0 as the relative risks of U on D given E = 1 and E = 0, respectively. Assumption 1
is equivalent to
Therefore, the observed relative risk of E on D
can be expressed as
The last equation above is obtained by replacing r * 0 /r 0 by {RR 0 f + (1 − f )}/{RR 1 f + (1 − f )} due to (17). The above equation can be further simplified as
We first treat (RR 1 , RR 0 , f 1 , f 0 ) as fixed, and thus G is a function of p e with partial derivative
Therefore, G is increasing in p e ∈ [0, 1] if RR 0 > RR 1 , and non-increasing in p e ∈ [0, 1] if RR 0 ≤ RR 1 . Our proof below is divided into two cases accordingly. If RR 0 > RR 1 , G has its maximum at p e = 1 or f = f 1 . Therefore,
With f 1 ≥ f 0 , we must have RR 0 ≥ 1, since RR 0 < 1 would contradict the assumption RR ED ≥ 1. Then (18) attains its maximum at f 1 = 1 and f 0 = 0, implying that RR ED ≤ 285
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We further obtain from (18) that
where the second inequality in (19) holds since f 1 ≥ f 0 . If RR 0 ≤ RR 1 , G has its maximum at p e = 0 or f = f 0 . Therefore,
By similar argument, we must have RR 1 ≥ 1, and the right-hand side of (20) 
as the standardized relative risk with the exposed group taken as the standard population,
as the standardized relative risk with the unexposed group taken as the standard population, and
as the standardized relative risk with the total group as the standard population. And the confounding relative risks are defined as CRR E+ = RR ED /SRR E+ , CRR E− = RR ED /SRR E− , and CRR T = RR ED /SRR T . Lee (2011) showed that
where w is a positive number between 0 and 1. The following conclusions in Lee (2011) are 295 useful for our proof:
Proof. It can be directly verified that
PENG DING AND TYLER J. VANDERWEELE is increasing in both U D and U E . For example, we have
By definition of U ′ D and according to Lee (2011) , we have
When Assumption 1 holds with SRR T = 1, we have 
. Therefore, Lee (2011)'s conditions hold for U E and U ′ D .
APPENDIX C
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This Appendix gives proofs of the generalized Cornfield conditions for the risk difference under Assumption 1. In order to prove Theorems 1 to 3, we need the following lemma. LEMMA 1. Under Assumption 1, the risk difference of E on D can be expressed as
Proof of Lemma 1. First, Assumption 1 is equivalent to
Generalized Cornfield conditions
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and therefore we have
Applying the law of total probability, we have that
Using the fact that α 0 = − K−1 k=1 α k , we obtain that
Proof of Theorem 1. For a binary confounder U with K = 2, we have RD ED = α 1 {β 11 pr(E = 0) + β 01 pr(E = 1)} = RD EU {RD U D|E=1 pr(E = 0) + RD U D|E=0 pr(E = 1)}.
Since RD ED ≥ 0 and RD EU ≥ 0, we have RD U D|E=1 pr(E = 0) + RD U D|E=0 pr(E = 1) ≥ 0. Evidently, it is impossible that both RD U D|E=1 and RD U D|E=0 are negative. When RD U D|E=1 > 0 and RD U D|E=0 > 0, we have RD U D|E=1 pr(E = 0) + RD U D|E=0 pr(E = 1) < max(RD U D|E=1 , RD U D|E=0 ). When RD U D|E=1 > 0 and RD U D|E=0 < 0, we have RD U D|E=1 pr(E = 0) + RD U D|E=0 pr(E = 1) < RD U D|E=1 = max(RD U D|E=1 , RD U D|E=0 ). When RD U D|E=1 < 0 and RD U D|E=0 > 0, we also have RD U D|E=1 pr(E = 0) + RD U D|E=0 pr(E = 1) < max(RD U D|E=1 , RD U D|E=0 ). Therefore, RD ED ≤ RD EU × max(RD U D|E=1 , RD U D|E=0 ), which implies that min RD EU , max(RD U D|E=1 , RD U D|E=0 ) ≥ RD ED , max RD EU , max(RD U D|E=1 , RD U D|E=0 ) ≥ RD k=1 |α k | = 2. Therefore, A can attain its lower bound 2/(K − 1), which, in this case, is smaller than RD ED /2. In summary, the lower bound for 325 max (A, B) is max(A, B) ≥ {RD ED /(K − 1)} 1/2 , if (K − 1)RD ED ≤ 4, and
